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Abstract
In this article, we presented evidence that people are more risk averse when investing in 
financial products in the real world than when they make risky choices between gambles in 
laboratory experiments. In order to provide an account for this discrepancy, we conducted 
experiments, which showed that the range of offered investment funds that vary in their risk-
reward characteristics had a significant effect on the distribution of hypothetical funds to 
those products. We also showed that people are able to use the context provided by the choice 
set in order the make relative riskiness judgments for investment products. This context 
dependent relativistic nature of risk preferences is proposed as a plausible explanation of the 
risk preference discrepancy between laboratory experiments and real-world investments. We 
also discuss other possible theoretical interpretations of the discrepancy.
Keywords: risk aversion; decision making; investment risk
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A Prospect Relativity Account of the Discrepancy Between Risk Preferences in Laboratory 
Gambles and Real World Investments
In psychology and experimental economics, experimental participants usually make 
choices between risky prospects, or assign values or certainty equivalents to risky prospects. 
Participants’ level of risk aversion can be deduced from these choices. A level of risk 
aversion can also be deduced by examining how people assign their real-world assets to 
different investments (e.g., a building society account, property, or the stock market). We 
show that there is a discrepancy between the level of risk aversion shown in laboratory 
experiments and the level or risk aversion implicit in people’s asset allocation. Typically, far 
more risk aversion is shown in the allocation of real-world assets. 
This article also offers an account of this discrepancy: We suggest that the 
discrepancy is a result of people’s inability to make absolute judgments of the riskiness of a 
laboratory gamble or an investment. Recent evidence (Stewart, Chater, Stott, & Reimers, 
2003) suggests that instead of making absolute judgments of the riskiness of prospects, 
people in fact judge the riskiness of prospects relative to the riskiness of other prospects in 
the choice set. Thus what matters in participants’ judgment of the riskiness of a prospect is 
not the overall level of riskiness, but rather how the riskiness of the prospect compares to that 
of other prospects on offer. In the remainder of this article we present evidence to support our 
claim that there is a discrepancy between the level of risk aversion demonstrated in the 
laboratory and that evident in real-world decision under risk. We will then outline some 
evidence that supports our assertion that absolute assessments of the value or utility of a 
prospect or gamble are not available and instead only relative judgments can be made before 
explaining how this allows the discrepancy between laboratory and real-world behavior. 
Finally, we present some experimental evidence that real-world risky outcomes are assessed 
relative to one another, and that although there is a discrepancy between these decisions and 
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laboratory decisions the two are related.
The Discrepancy between the Level of Risk Aversion Shown in the Laboratory and That 
Shown in the Real World
In this section we will examine the level of risk aversion shown in laboratory studies 
and that shown in the real world. First however, it is necessary to introduce a simple measure 
of risk aversion. Traditionally, risk aversion for gains is explained in terms of utility being a 
negatively accelerated power function of value, as in expected utility theory (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947; see Bell & Fishburn, 1999, Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1979, and Luce, 
2000, for a discussion and comparison of alternate functions). Figure 1 shows a hypothetical 
utility function, where the utility is an increasing but decelerating power function of money 
with exponent γ where, for a decelerating utility function 0<γ<1. The smaller the value of γ 
the more concave the function. Consider, for example, a choice between £50 and a 50% 
chance of winning £100, otherwise nothing. For γ<1, the utility of £100 is less than twice the 
utility of £50. Thus the expected utility of £50, U(£50) is greater than the expected utility of 
the gamble 50% chance of £100 otherwise nothing, 0.5U(£0)+0.5U(£100), and the sure £50 
is preferred over the 50% chance of £100, even though both options have the same expected 
value. The curvature of the utility function or degree of risk aversion, as measured by γ, 
determines the difference in expected utility, and thus degree of risk aversion.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Risk Aversion in the Laboratory
In laboratory experiments we often observe what appears to be risk-averse behavior 
over small amount of money (typical payment rates are less than $50/ hour, and play rarely 
lasts two hours). Much recent experimental research calculating coefficients of relative risk 
aversion finds reasonable coefficients between 0 and 1, although this research ignores initial 
wealth and income (i.e., utility is defined only over gains). For example, Holt and Laury 
5
Risk Preference Discrepancy
(2002) discovered that the average coefficient of relative risk aversion in the domain of gains 
is 0.4. We observed values of risk aversion in this range in an unpublished study from our 
laboratory, in which the measures were deduced from choices between simple prospects and 
sure amounts (the risk attitudes shown in our study indicated that the average risk aversion is 
around 0.6). Cardenas & Carpenter (2005) report estimates between 0.32 and 1.25 in a review 
of studies of risky choice in developing countries. Binswanger (1981) found similar 
coefficients of partial relative risk aversion (the coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
multiplied by the stake of the gamble) in experiments with rural farmers in rural India, which 
involved ‘high-stake’ gambles for a significant fraction of annual income. Schechter (in 
press) reports similar coefficients (0.81) derived from choices (involving modest-stakes) 
made by rural Paraguayans whose income levels are known but not taken into account. Two 
other studies report similar coefficients even when annual income is considered as a proxy of 
‘total wealth’---one derived the coefficients from choices of deductibles in the car insurance 
market (Cohen & Einav, 2005) and another from play in a TV game show (Gertner, 1993).  
These results also suggest that people isolate the risky decision in the game from 
considerations of their final wealth status, i.e., assumptions about asset integration do not 
hold (Schechter, 2006). This behavior is known as “choice bracketing” or “narrow framing.” 
Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999) discuss the many ways choice bracketing may affect 
decision making in daily life. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) hypothesize that people are 
overly uncomfortable to take risks in their choices because they evaluate risky prospects one 
at a time rather than pooling risks. In summary, theories show that people bracket instead of 
integrating the choice options into their wealth. This is as if their assumed wealth is contained 
to the gains presented by the current choice set (or context), for which we are going to present 
a more systematic account in this article. 
Risk Aversion in the Real World
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In the financial market there are a variety of products that vary in their position on a 
continuum where risk and return are traded off. At one end there are bank accounts offering a 
fixed return, and at the other end are stocks and shares that offer a larger return on average, 
but are more risky as the return is subject to some variation. Under standard assumptions, we 
deduce expressions for the utility of an investment in a product with a given level of risk and 
return after one year, before extending the result to investments for more than one year. We 
then show that investing in a given product is indicative of a specific level of risk aversion. 
In the following analysis a financial product, X, is modeled by assuming the annual 
return is log normally distributed about a mean of μX with standard deviation of σX. Figure 2 
illustrates the distribution of returns for several products differing in mean return, μ, and 
standard deviation, σ. The expected utility for a product can be determined by calculating the 
utility of each possible return of the product, and then averaging these utilities together, 
weighted by their probability of occurring. Here utility is assumed to be a power function of 
money, with exponent γ. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The derivation of the utility of a product as a function of the mean return, μ, the 
standard deviation, σ, and an individual’s level of risk aversion, γ, is given in the Appendix. 
Note that it is possible to talk of the utility of a product because utility is assumed to be a 
power function of money. Strictly speaking talk should be of the utility of a given investment 
in a product. However, when comparing the relative expected utility of a given investment 
across two products, the actual amount of money invested does not matter - if the investment 
amount were multiplied by an arbitrary constant, the ratio of the utilities of the two products 
will remain the same. In the remainder of this paper the expression "utility of a product" will 
be used as shorthand for "the utility of a £1 investment in that product". 
Figure 3 plots the trade-off between return, μ, and risk, σ observed for a set of 
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financial products in the market place. Return is a linear function of risk because modern 
portfolio theory assumes that the required return is a linear function of the risk free rate of 
return, the market risk premium, and an index of systematic risk. This model is known as the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964). It is also the equation 
for the Security Market Line and the different lines in Figure 3 correspond to different 
hypothetical markets, where the trade-off between risk and return varies.  
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
For a given market, the utility of each product can be determined. Each panel in 
Figure 4 plots the utility of a product, U(X), against the product’s annual return, μX, for a 
range of risk aversions (0.2≤γ≤1.0). The panels differ in the trade-off between risk and return 
assumed - there is one panel for each market illustrated in Figure 3. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
The results in Figure 4A, for the market represented by the shallowest line in Figure 3 
(where high return products are relatively low risk compared to the high return products of 
other markets), show utility is an increasing function of return for the range of products 
1.05≤μ≤1.20 when 0.2≤γ≤1.0. Thus, of the products with returns in the range explored, the 
preferred product is the one with the highest return independent of an individual’s degree of 
risk aversion. Figure 4D explores the case where the trade-off between risk and return is less 
favorable, that is, risk increases more quickly as return increases. Here expected utility does 
not increase as risk and return increase. Initially expected utility does increase with expected 
return, but then it begins to decrease. Here, for a product with high risk and return the 
concave downward utility function means that the reduced utility of possible low returns is no 
longer offset by the increased utility from possible high returns. The location of the product 
with maximum utility is different for different degrees of risk aversion. The more risk averse 
an individual, the lower the risk and return of the product with the greatest utility. 
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Investments Over Longer Time Periods. Investments for longer time periods require 
further assumptions. Over a longer time period the return from a product will compound. This 
is modeled by assuming the annual return for a product X is drawn from a log normal 
distribution mean μX and standard deviation σX, and that the return in each year is independent 
of previous years. Expressions for the distribution of returns and utility of a product in terms 
of the mean and standard deviation of the product, the duration of the investment in years, n, 
and the level of risk aversion, γ, are derived in the Appendix. Figure 5 illustrates how the 
distribution of returns for a product changes with time. The mean return increases 
exponentially over time, and the standard deviation also increases (in a more complicated 
way). 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
In Figure 6, the utility of a product is plotted against the return of that product with 
each curve representing the expected utility for the products in the market after different 
amounts of time have elapsed. The top panel is for a market where risk increases more slowly 
with time than the bottom panel. The product with the maximum utility is constant across 
time. In other words, the product with the maximum utility after one year is the same product 
as the product with the maximum utility after n years. Proof that the duration of the 
investment does not alter the product with maximum utility is given in the Appendix.
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
The Level of Risk Aversion in the Real World. There is surprisingly little systematic 
evidence about how risk averse people are. Still, there is enough convincing evidence that 
people’s risk aversion, or gamma, is much higher in the real-world financial decision making. 
Well known evidence that people’s risk aversion is higher in the real-world financial decision 
making is the equity premium puzzle, which shows that the risk premium investors put on 
risky assets (the extra return/profit they expect from a risky asset, i.e. a reward that is 
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appropriate to the risk, relative to the risk-free return from safe assets like bonds or cash) is 
unrealistically high (Mehra & Prescott, 1985). The size and persistence of the excess return 
on stocks over fixed income securities and the observed disparity implies implausibly high 
degrees of risk aversion in standard models of asset pricing (although since the return on 
stocks is more variable, standard theory is consistent with some difference in the long-run 
rates of return). In other world, the puzzle exists because the excess of stock returns over 
returns on investments in bills or bonds is larger than can be explained by standard models of 
‘rational’ asset prices. For example, a person with enough risk aversion, to explain the equity 
premium would be indifferent between a coin flip paying either $50,000 or $100,000 and a 
sure amount of $51,209. 
Figure 7 shows risk premiums plotted against gamma. The risk premiums are taken 
from classic studies which relate gamma to risk premium in the market (Friend & Blume, 
1975; Hildreth & Knowles, 1982; Kydland & Prescott, 1982; Tobin & Dolde, 1978). Figure 7 
gives some idea of the range of γ values in the real world because these studies have used a 
representative set of investment portfolios. Figure 7 also displays the slope and intercept of 
the risk against return line derived from (projected on the basis of) the real world studies and 
the laboratory experiments. Therefore, using the method described in this section, we can 
work out individual’s exposure to risk, which is substituted for a single point on the risk 
return line, and then work back to γ (we know the distribution of assets in these portfolios and 
their return, and hence can infer the beta coefficient for each portfolio). Here we used a 
hypothetical power law utility function, in which γ is the exponent which describes the 
curvature of this function. γ = 1 for a risk-neutral person. Smaller values of γ denote greater 
risk aversion. People are risk prone if their γ is over 1.
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
As you can see the gammas for the investment portfolios are negative. Such negative 
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exponent means super risk averse preferences, which are much more risk averse than the risk 
attitudes shown in the laboratory studies where the average γ is around 0.6. These levels of 
risk aversion shown in the laboratory are derived from the studies described in the previous 
section here (entitled Risk Aversion in the Laboratory). In summary, Figure 7 demonstrates 
that there is a big discrepancy between the level of risk aversion shown in laboratory 
experiments and the level or risk aversion implicit in people’s asset allocation. Typically, far 
more risk aversion is shown in the allocation of real-world assets, which is reflected in the 
demanded higher risk premium. 
This discrepancy could have very important consequences in terms of asset prices and 
stock returns. Figure 8 shows the implication of various risk aversion levels for asset values 
in terms of stock prices of a portfolio containing the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The 
curve represents the market valuation of a portfolio containing these assets. This projected 
curve shows that if people become less risk averse, i.e. like the level shown in lab tests, then 
the stocks will be much more attractive (say, as opposite to bonds). In other words, if γ were 
higher, such portfolio would be perceived as having more attractive risk-return 
characteristics, or as worth more. As a result, investors would buy more shares and the stock 
prices will increase. And this potential price increase across all stocks represented in the 
index is shown by the line connecting the current levels of risk aversion (gammas) in the 
stock market (as we estimated it before) and the risk aversion levels shown in laboratory 
experiments. The curve was made in two steps. First we used a linear formula used in modern 
portfolio theory, which links gamma to investment rates of return: γ = dE(r)/dσ. In modern 
portfolio theory, risk aversion is measured as the marginal reward an investor wants to 
receive E(r) if he takes for a new amount of risk σ. Since we know the values of both γ and σ 
(for real world and lab studies), then we can infer the rate of return for various levels of these 
variables. Once the expected return, E(r), is calculated, the future cash flows of the assets can 
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be discounted to their present value using this rate to establish the correct price for the assets. 
This is a CAPM formula (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964), which links rates of return to market 
valuation. (These are all standard formulas that can be found in most finance textbooks and 
hence we do not discuss them in detail here.)
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
Thus, Figure 8 is showing the effect of shifting the risk aversion levels (or what we 
could call the “psychological foundations” for stock prices). Such a shifting is possible 
because, as we demonstrate later in our experiments, people’s risk aversion (gamma) is 
wildly manipulable by contexts and by distorting sampling in the environment or memory. In 
summary, if we suppose that the financial assets provide their own sample, or context, in 
relation to which people judge the riskiness of the assets, then the risk premium and stock 
values can be quite detached from any psychological fundamentals. The experiments 
presented in the next section aim to test and support this claim. 
A Prospect Relativity Account of the Risk Aversion Discrepancy
Traditionally, models of decision under risk assume that every risk prospect can be 
assigned a value or utility and that for a given prospect this assignment is independent of 
other prospects that may be available in the choice set. EU theory (axiomized by von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), prospect and cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), and rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 
1982, 1993) all make this assumption. An alternative is that the assignment of a utility to a 
given prospect is not independent of the utility of other prospects. In regret theory (Loomes & 
Sugden, 1982) the utility of a prospect is modified to take into account possible feelings of 
regret (or rejoicing) about outcomes that would have obtained if different choices had been 
made. Thus, the utility of a prospect is not independent of the other prospects in the choice 
set. Similarly, in the componential context model (Tversky & Simonson, 1993) utilities or 
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values are modified by the relative trade-off between object attributes, although this theory 
was not extended to decision under risk. The stochastic difference model (González-Vallejo, 
2002) makes the strong assumption that the degree of preference for one prospect over 
another depends only on a relative comparison of prospect attributes (i.e., prospects are 
judged relative to one another and thus, the choice between options is made in relative rather 
than absolute terms). This is also a core assumption in multialternative decision field theory 
(Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001) although this theory is of decisions between certain 
outcomes, and has not been extended to decision under risk.
Stewart, Stott, Chater, and Reimers (2003) provide evidence that prospects are judged 
or valued relative to one another. In one experiment, participants were offered a set of 
prospects and asked to select a single prospect to play. Within the set, the probability of 
winning a prospect was reduced as the amount that could be won was increased. Thus each 
participant faced a choice between prospects offering small amounts with high probability 
through to larger amounts with a lower probability. Different groups of participants were 
offered different sets. One group of participants were offered the full set of 10 prospects. Two 
additional groups were offered a restricted choice: one group was offered only the 5 most 
risky prospects (lower probabilities of higher amounts) and another group was offered only 
the 5 least risk prospects (higher probabilities of lower amounts). If these participants’ 
preferences were not affected by the set of options provided, they should simply choose the 
prospect closest to the prospect they would select if they were offered all 10 prospects. 
However, the distribution of choices differed significantly from those expected under this 
prediction. Instead, the set of options available seemed to determine participants’ preferences: 
When the available prospects were ranked from most risky to least risky, the distribution of 
choices not differ significantly between the group offered only the least risky prospects and 
the group offered only the most risky prospects. Stewart et al. concluded that the level of risk 
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aversion shown by a participant was determined by the level of risk in the set (range) of 
prospects offered. There have been other experiments that have also investigated the effect of 
the set of available options in decision under risk. Birnbaum (1992) investigated a rank 
dependence effect (while Stewart et al. tested a range based effect) and demonstrated that the 
skew of the distribution of options offered as certainty equivalents for simple prospects, 
(while the maximum and minimum are held constant), influences the selection of a certainty 
equivalent. In particular, prospects were less valued in the positively skewed option set where 
most offered choice values were small, compared to when the options were negatively 
skewed and hence most offered values were large. 
Stewart et al.’s (2003) findings show the importance of the effects of the choice set on 
people’s preferences in various decision domains. One way to explain these effects is by 
assuming that people’s representations of the relevant dimensions (e.g., level of risk) are not 
stable, but are influenced by context. Parducci’s (1965, 1995) range-frequency theory of 
psychophysical judgment has been first proposed by Birnbaum (1992) and Stewart et al. 
(2003) as a possible explanatory model of this type of effect on risky choice. Range-
frequency theory predicts that the subjective value given to a magnitude is a function of its 
position within the overall range and rank of distribution of magnitudes that have been 
observed. Specifically, the impact of range is captured by expressing the current magnitude 
as a fraction of the interval from the lowest to the highest magnitude that has been 
encountered.
In summary, there is reasonable evidence and some precedent for assuming that 
prospects are judged relative to other prospects in the choice set, rather than in isolation. Such 
prospect relativity can also offer an account of the discrepancy in risk aversion between 
laboratory studies and real-world investments. The argument is as follows. Rather than 
assume that each individual has an absolute level of risk aversion (or alternatively a utility 
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function), we assume that instead each individual has a relative level of risk aversion. In other 
words, an individual might, for example, know that they are relatively risk averse. When 
presented with a set of options, they would therefore tend to select a relatively less risky 
option. Without an absolute grip on the riskiness of an alternative, the individual would be 
unable to judge whether the entire set of options were all very risky or all somewhat safer. 
Thus when offered a set of laboratory gambles that are, compared to real-world financial 
products, quite risky, the person will select one of the safer prospects. When the same 
individual is presented with a set of real-world financial options, that, when compared to the 
laboratory gambles, are all far less risky, they will still select a relatively safe option. Thus, 
because real world options are less risky than laboratory options, people would select less 
risky options in the real-world compared to laboratory experiments. 
Experiment 1A
The purpose of Experiment 1A was to investigate whether the choice set across which 
hypothetical investments are made influences the allocation made. Participants were offered a 
range of investment products that varied in the trade off between risk and return. The range of 
products offered varied between participants. One third of participants were offered the full 
range of products, and asked how they would split a given investment across the products. 
One third of participants completed the same task except they were only offered the less risky 
products, and one third of participants were offered only the more risky products. The logic 
in this design follows that of Stewart, Chater, Stott, and Reimers (2003).
Method
Participants. There were three between participant conditions, with 20 
undergraduates participating in each condition for payment of £1. 
Design and procedure. Participants were approached on the university campus. 
Participants were given a sheet containing a set of financial products, and asked to make a 
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hypothetical investment of £20,000 across the products, splitting the funds in any way they 
liked. The products offered were varied across three conditions. In the free choice condition, 
participants were offered all eight products described in Table 1. In the low risk condition, 
participants were only offered the four lowest risk-return products. In the high risk condition, 
participants were only offered the four highest risk-return products. The meaning of average 
return and the risk, or variation about that mean, was explained to participants. β (beta) was 
also provided, which is a measure of an investment’s return volatility in relation to the rest of 
the market. In other words, this is a risk measure indicating how does the stock’s price move 
relative to the overall market. The whole market, which for this purpose is considered the 
S&P 500, is assigned a beta of 1. Stocks with a beta of 1 fluctuate in price at the same rate as 
the market. Stocks that have a beta greater than 1 have greater price volatility than the overall 
market and are more risky, while stocks with a beta of less than 1 have less price volatility 
than the market and are less risky. Since risk also implies return, stocks with a high beta 
should have a higher return than the market (i.e., accepting more risk, should bring more 
reward). It was explained that β might be useful to finance students. 
Results
The mean funding allocated to each product is shown in Figure 9A. In the free choice 
condition, where all products were offered, there is a slight bias towards low risk-return 
products. Product β=0.4 was also unpopular. In the low and high conditions, there was also a 
bias towards low risk-return products, and in addition, the highest risk product in each 
condition was also favored, with the distribution of funds following a “U” shape.
The effect of context was measured in two ways. First, for each participant a weighted 
mean β value was calculated by summing the mathematical product of the β value for each 
financial product and the funds invested, and then dividing by the total finds invested. β, then, 
provides a measure of the level of risk-reward for each participant’s investment. If 
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participants are unaffected by the context, the mean β across participants in each condition 
should not differ between conditions. The mean β values were: 0.26 (S.E. 0.04) for the low 
condition; 0.67 (S.E. 0.08) for the free choice condition; 1.24 (S.E. 0.06) for the high 
condition. Planned t tests found a significant difference between the mean β values low and 
free choice conditions, t(38)=4.52, p<.0001, and a between the free choice and high 
conditions, t(38)=5.52, p<.0001. 
An alternate analysis is to assume that participants in the restricted range low and high 
conditions, who would otherwise choose products outside that range, should make up for this 
by placing all funding that had wanted to place outside the range into the nearest available 
product. So, for example, in the low condition, funding that participants would normally have 
assigned to the higher risk-return products (0.8≤β≤2.0) should be assigned into the highest 
risk-return product available (β=0.6). If participants in the low condition were following this 
strategy, then their allocation to the β=0.6 product should not differ significantly from free 
choice condition participants allocation to products with β≥0.6. In fact the funding allocated 
to product β=0.6 in the low condition is significantly less than the funding allocated to 
products β≥0.6 in the free choice condition, t(38)=2.94, p=.0130. Similarly, funding allocated 
to product β=0.8 in the high condition is significantly less than the funding allocated to 
products β≤0.8 in the free choice condition, t(38)=4.08, p=.0001. 
Discussion
The range of risk-reward of financial products offered was found to have a significant 
effect on the distribution of hypothetical funds to those products. Participants behaving 
optimally should seek the same weighted mean β, a measure that represents the overall level 
of risk-reward for each participant’s investment, no matter what financial options are 
available to them. Instead participants offered only low risk-return products had a 
significantly lower β than those given a free choice, and participant offered only high risk-
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return products had a significantly higher β. Participants were also found not to be using a 
simpler but sub-optimal strategy to compensate for being constrained to choose from a 
restricted set of products. This strategy involved lumping all funding they would have liked 
to invest at a higher risk-reward level into the highest risk reward level available, and all 
funding they would have liked to invest in lower risk-reward products into the lowest risk 
reward available. In conclusion, the range or risk-reward spanned by the products offered 
strongly affects participants’ hypothetical investments. 
Experiment 1B
An alternative account of the results of Experiment 1A is that participants simply did 
not pay attention to the risk and return of each product. For this reason, we attempted to 
replicate the results of Experiment 1A, while omitting the prose describing each product. 
Method
Participants. There were three between participant conditions, with 20 new 
undergraduates participating in each condition for payment of £1. 
Design and procedure. The design and procedure was the same as that of Experiment 
1A, except that only the return (expressed as the percentage average annual return) and risk 
(expressed as a confidence interval about the average return, e.g., ±4%) were presented for 
each product.
Results and Discussion
The mean funding allocated to each product is shown in Figure 9B. In the free choice 
condition, where all products were offered, there is a stronger bias towards low risk-return 
products than seen in Experiment 1A. In the low and high conditions, the “U” shaped 
distribution of funding was not as prevalent as in Experiment 1A. 
As in Experiment 1A the effect of context was measured in two ways. First, for each 
participant a weighted mean β value was calculated by summing the mathematical product of 
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the β value for each financial product and the funds invested, and then dividing by the total 
finds invested. β, then, provides a measure of the level of risk-reward for each participant’s 
investment. If participants are unaffected by the context, the mean β across participants in 
each condition should not differ between conditions. The mean β values were: 0.22 (S.E. 
0.02) for the low condition; 0.61 (S.E. 0.11) for the free choice condition; 1.37 (S.E. 0.08) for 
the high condition. Planned t tests found a significant difference between the mean β values 
low and free choice conditions, t(38)=3.61, p=.0009, and a between the free choice and high 
conditions, t(38)=5.71, p<.0001. 
As in Experiment 1A, an alternate analysis is to assume that participants in the 
restricted range low and high conditions, who would otherwise choose products outside that 
range, should make up for this by placing all funding that had wanted to place outside the 
range into the nearest available product. Participants allocated significantly less funding to 
the β=0.6 product in the low condition that to products with β≥0.6 in the free choice 
condition, t(38)=3.38, p=.0017. Similarly, funding allocated to product β=0.8 in the high 
condition is significantly less than the funding allocated to products β≤0.8 in the free choice 
condition, t(38)=6.08, p<.0001. 
The effect of the choice set offered on asset allocation seen in Experiment 1A has 
been replicated when participants were presented with only the return and risk of a product.
Experiment 1C
The purpose of Experiment 1C was to attempt to replicated the results of Experiments 
1A and 1B using a non-student population.
Method
The method is as for Experiment 1A, except participants were conference guests 
attending conferences at Warwick.
Results and Discussion
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Figure 9C shows the mean funding allocated to each product for the free choice 
condition and the two restricted choice conditions. The distribution of funding for of 
Experiments 1A and 1B has been replicated, with a bias towards low risk-return products in 
the free choice condition, and the “U” shaped distribution in each of the restricted conditions. 
The weighted mean β for the low condition (mean=0.24, S.E.=0.02) is significantly lower 
than the weighted mean β for the free choice condition (mean=0.55, S.E.=0.05), t(38)=5.23, 
p<.0001. The weighted mean β for the high condition (mean=1.23, S.E.=0.04) is significantly 
higher than the weighted mean β for the free choice condition, t(38)=17.05, p<.0001. 
Following the alternate analysis, the funding allocated to product β=0.6 in the low condition 
is significantly less than the funding allocated to products β≥0.6 in the free choice condition, 
t(38)=3.17, p=.0030. Similarly, funding allocated to product β=0.8 in the high condition is 
significantly less than the funding allocated to products β≤0.8 in the free choice condition, 
t(38)=6.67, p<.0001.
Experiment 1C replicated the context effect from Experiment 1A and 1B in a non-
student population. 
Experiment 2
Our claim in this article is that people have difficulty assessing the absolute riskiness 
of a financial product, and instead make relative riskiness judgments for each product using 
the context provided by the choice set. The purpose of this second experiment is to test 
whether the participants are really able to make such relative comparisons, and also we aimed 
to verify that they are not just responding randomly in Experiments 1A-1C due to a lack of 
sensitivity to, or understanding of, the choice options. For example, it is still possible that the 
relativistic effect observed in these experiments could be due to people not been sensitive to 
the relative riskiness of the investment options in high range vs. low range condition. Note 
that our main claim is that human risk preferences are unstable and relativistic, not that 
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people cannot perceive the relative riskiness of the options in the choice set.
It is typically assumed that, in a financial market, that risk and return are linearly 
related: As the risk increases, so does the return. A product is particularly good therefore, if it 
lies below the line of risk plotted against return for that market (see Figure 3), as, for the 
product’s level of return, the associated risk associated is lower than for other products in the 
market. Similarly, a product that lies above the risk against return is less efficient than other 
products in the market. It is not necessary to abstract absolute notions of the utility of each 
product in order to identify favorable or poor products in this way. Even if one has no idea of 
the market trade-off between risk and return, one may infer it from the choice set, and then 
identify outlying products. Indeed there is evidence that people are able to make such 
judgments in other contexts. Simonson and Tversky (1992) found effects of the trade-off 
between two attributes, either in previous choices or within the current choice set, for 
attribute pairs such as cash and gift coupons, price and amount of memory for personal 
computers, or tires varying in price and warranty duration. 
In previous experiments, the products offered to participants always lay on the same 
risk-return line. In this experiment, for some participants a single product in the choice set lay 
above the line, and for other participants a single product lay below the line. If participants 
are able to make relative comparisons between products they should be sensitive to this 
manipulation and assign less of their funding to the above the line product and more of their 
funding to a below the line product.
The experiment described here investigates whether people are sensitive to the other 
options in the choice set by using an investment situation, in which people are asked to divide 
a lump sum defined as a cash windfall between three different investment products differing 
in their increasing risk-return characteristics. The three financial products offered different 
expected return from a unit of investment, and higher average return was associated with 
21
Risk Preference Discrepancy
higher variability of this return (which is also a measure of the investment risk). In this 
scenario, the attractiveness of the middle option was manipulated by increasing and 
decreasing its expected return in comparison to the risk-return line and keeping its risk 
properties fixed.
Method
Participants. There were 42 participants in each of the two conditions in this study, 
84 in total. The participants were recruited from the University of Oxford student population 
via the experimental economics research group mailing list of people who have asked to be 
contacted participated in this experiment. 
Design. The task was formulated as an investment decision problem. The participants 
had to decide how to allocate £25,000 between three risky investment products that differ in 
the increasing expected degree of risk and return embedded in each of them. The risk here is 
understood as a possible variation of the capital return around (i.e., plus/minus) some 
expected average return. The least risky product was a Unit Trust Fund with mixed portfolio 
of stocks and bonds, which offers 8% annual average return and the annual return varies by 
±12% around the average. The second product was Index Tracking Fund. The context 
manipulation was created by manipulating the expected return of the Index Tracking Fund 
(the middle option). In the bad investment condition the expected average return was 9.5%, 
and in the good investment condition the expected return was 12.5%. The third and riskiest 
product was a Hedge Fund offering expected annual average return of 15%, which however 
may vary ±40% around this average (characteristic of this fund is that it uses investor funds 
to borrow more money to put in the markets). 
Figure 10 presents graphically the products that were displaced from the risk-return 
line. Thus, there were two between-participants conditions. In the bad investment condition 
the second product is above the line, while in the good investment condition the same product 
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is below the line. The expected difference between the mean return of the good and the bad 
product was 3%, which however small, still changed the underlying economic rationality of 
the decision problem because if people are rational optimizers, they should put more of their 
funds in the product above the line, and less in a product below the line (and in this case they 
should distribute more of their capital between the other two products). Our manipulation was 
expected to prompt such behavior because of the empirical evidence by Stewart et al. (2003) 
that people are sensitive mainly to the set of available options.  
Procedure. The design of the materials was the same as that of Experiment 1A, except 
that only three products were used in each condition. The participants were given a sheet of 
paper with written instruction explaining that the purpose of the experiment is to allocate the 
funds by indicating how much they would invest in each of the products described in the 
table below the instruction (splitting funds between products as they see fit). Participants 
were informed also that some investments offer a smaller return, but are relatively low risk, 
while other investments offer a larger average return, but carry more risk, but all investment 
products are efficient in a capital markets sense in that they represent the best rates available 
for the risk being undertaken. There was a table bellow the instruction, which contained the 
name of the investment products, and their expected return and risk (variability). There was 
also an explanation involving an example how to interpret the return and risk figures in the 
table. 
Results and Discussion
The allocations to each financial product in each of the two conditions are presented 
in Figure 11 (the two conditions are presented as separate lines). There is a clear tendency 
that people tend to invest less as the product becomes more risky, which shows that people 
are risk averse in general. It appears also that the participants were most sensitive to the 
manipulation in the bad investment condition for the Index Fund, which received on average 
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less investment than the good investment condition. The average allocation to the Index 
tracking fund in the bad investment condition was £5,708, while in the good investment 
condition the average allocation in the Index Fund was £7,518. The difference between these 
average investments allocated to the Index Fund in the bad condition and the good condition 
was statistically significant, t(82) = 2.07, p = .042. This result confirms our initial predictions 
about the existence of contrast effect due to the relative comparison of the middle option with 
the other two available options in each condition. 
The results demonstrated that the manipulation of the attractiveness of the middle 
investment option in comparison with the two neighbouring options affected participants’ 
investment decisions. People invested significantly more in the middle option if it was above 
the control condition compared to the case when it was below it, although in none of the 
conditions the middle option stochastically dominated anyone of the two other options or was 
dominated by them. This result confirms that people are able to make relative riskiness 
judgments for each product using the context provided by the choice set. This experiment 
also demonstrates that people do make such relative comparisons. Thus, this conclusion 
rejects the hypothesis that the relativistic effects observed in Experiments 1A-1C could be 
caused by random responding due to a lack sensitivity to, or understanding of, the choice 
options.
One mechanism by which people may be identifying the favorable and poor products 
is to fit a regression line of risk against return using the products, and then note the degree to 
which each product differs from this line. This is consistent with the componential context 
account of trade-off contrast offered by Tversky and Simonson (1993). In this account the 
advantage for one product over another is the sum of all the attribute differences in its favor, 
and the disadvantage is the sum of all of the attribute differences against it. Together the 
advantage and disadvantage scores are used to construct a relative preference for one product 
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over the other. Extending choices beyond binary sets, the relative advantage for one product 
over the other is the sum of all of the pair-wise relative advantages. Thus, for example, 
products below the risk against return line are assigned higher relative preference because the 
relative improvement in return is not offset by the increase in risk.
General Discussion
First we showed that laboratory behavior with gambles is more risky than people’s 
allocation of funds to financial products in more realistic setting. This is a result with 
important practical consequences. Then we demonstrated that the choice set across which 
hypothetical investments are made influences the allocation made. In particular, we found 
that the range of risk-reward of financial products offered has a significant effect on the 
distribution of hypothetical funds to those products. We also showed that people are able to 
make relative riskiness judgments for investment products using the context provided by the 
choice set. Thus on the whole, we demonstrated that prospect relativity can explain the risk 
aversion discrepancy between the real world and laboratory setting because choices in both 
domains are contingent on the context. Thus as a result the really risk averse choice in real 
world investments might be due to the low risk set of investment options with which people 
are presented. Note that actual financial decisions are also assumed to be influenced by 
accessibility (availability) of more risky investment options (e.g., how easy it is to buy 
shares). Our experiments indicate that had the investors been presented with more risky 
options (e.g., hedge funds, in which ordinary small investors do not have access to invest 
because of legal constraints), then they would have selected riskier investments. In other 
words, if people select the safer options from the safer range of investment options, then they 
overall risk aversion compared the whole set (i.e., all options available on the market, or 
relative to the total market portfolio) would appear to be extremely risk averse. 
These findings illustrate that investors have ill-formed preferences about their 
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investments, which is consistent with Stewart et al.’s (2003) claims. We are not the first study 
to show the relativity of investment preferences. Benartzi and Thaler (2002) asked 
individuals to choose among investment programs that offer different ranges of retirement 
income (for instance, a certain amount of $900 per month versus a 50/50 chance to earn 
either $1,100 per month or $800 per month). When they presented individuals with three 
choices ranging from low risk to high risk, they found a significant tendency to pick the 
middle choice. For instance, people viewing choices A, B, and C, will often find B more 
attractive than C. However, those viewing choices B, C, and D, will often argue that C is 
more attractive than B. Benartzi and Thaler (2002) give a hypothetical scenario that illustrates 
what could possibly happen if people persistently avoid extremes and choices between 
alternatives depend on the other options available. For example, if there are three possible 
portfolios, which offer different proportions of stocks---0% (conservative), 40% (moderate), 
and 80% (aggressive), respectively, then choosing the middle portfolio implies a moderate 
risk taking. However, when the three options are 40%, 70%, and 100%, respectively, then 
choosing the middle option implies aggressive portfolio. Such effects of the choice set are 
analogous to Benartzi and Thaler’s (2002) demonstration that investors prefer the middle 
fund in a range of funds ranked according to risk level, only due to its relative position. 
Similarly, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) showed that participants invest more money in equity 
funds when the offered plan contains mostly equity funds. These results also imply that 
financial advisors may ‘guide’ investment decisions simply by selecting the array of funds 
offered to investors. 
Our demonstration, that risk aversion in the real world is a product of the set of risky 
investment options with which people are presented, was also demonstrated by Benartzi and 
Thaler (2001) who found evidence of the same phenomenon by studying how people allocate 
their retirement funds across various investment vehicles. In particular, they find some 
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evidence for what they call the 1/n heuristic. This is a bias to divide the money evenly among 
the funds offered (when an employee is offered n funds to choose from in her retirement 
plan), which implies that the asset allocation an investor chooses will depend strongly on the 
array of funds offered in the retirement plan. For example, in a plan that offered one stock 
fund and one bond fund, the average allocation would be 50% stocks, but if another stock 
fund were added, the allocation to stocks would jump to two thirds. In a sample of US 401 
pension plans, Benartzi and Thaler regressed the percentage of the plan assets invested in 
stocks on the percentage of the funds that are stock funds and found a very strong 
relationship. 
These results are particularly relevant to our claims in this article, because Benartzi 
and Thaler’s study used real-world data on the distribution of assets across pension funds 
with different levels of risk due to the different numbers of stocks and bonds offered by each 
particular employer. Thus, this study creates a natural experiment that allows us to compare 
the effects of offering many stocks and less number of bonds versus small number of stock 
and many bonds. The results showing a strong effect of the choice set on actual behavior 
demonstrates again that risk aversion is the world is probably due to the partial exposure to 
only a limited set of investment opportunities. Thus, risk aversion is shown to depend on the 
particular mix of fixed income and equity funds on offer. If the plan offers many fixed-
income funds the participants might invest too conservatively and will appear very risk 
averse. Similarly, if the plan offers many equity funds the employees might invest more 
aggressively and appear much less risk averse. This evidence is in line with our 
demonstration that the risk aversion discrepancy is due to a biased sample of choice options. 
Alternative Explanations of the Risk Aversion Discrepancy
There are some alternative explanations of the observation that laboratory behavior is 
somewhat more risky than people’s allocation of funds to real-world financial products. 
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Below we consider some. Note that some of these possibilities do not go against our 
theoretical point because they just provide a rational why people are exposed to a limited 
subset (biased sample) of investment options.
There is no discrepancy. It may be that people’s portfolio of investments is already 
quite risky because of property ownership (e.g., house mortgage), and so their remaining 
assets are rightly placed in less risky alternatives. We do not have data on all investments of 
the participants in the cited publications (Friend & Blume, 1975; Hildreth & Knowles, 1982; 
Kydland & Prescott, 1982; Tobin & Dolde, 1978), from which we derived our gamma 
estimates, in order to calculate the total risk exposure of each individual. Therefore we cannot 
reject this hypothesis right away. 
Accessibility of more risky financial products. It may be that the only reason that 
people are not invested in more risky financial products is that people are either not aware 
that such products exist, or not aware of how to go about investing in them. Alternatively it 
may be that the products are simply not available to them. For example, investing in hedge 
funds requires an investment of minimum of $50,000, which is aimed at preventing small 
scale investors being exposed to higher risk because they might not be able to recover 
financially from the potential losses. 
Lack of knowledge. The calculations involved in predicting possible returns from 
financial products are non-trivial (see the Appendix). It may be that if information about the 
distribution of potential returns from financial products could be made available to people, 
then people could be persuaded to make more risky investments. However, analysis of 
existing research literature on the role of learning and education, suggests that people cannot 
learn rational preferences, particularly with regard to risky financial decisions in experimental 
setting (Humphrey, 2001; Kagel & Levin, 1986; Loewenstein, 1999; Slovic & Tversky, 
1974). In order to converge to a rational equilibrium, learning requires endless trials and 
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practical experience of success and failure. Relying on such learning is impractical for many 
aspects of consumer financial decision-making, because of the relative infrequency of having 
to make such decisions in real life. Therefore more knowledge will not change preferences 
for risk. Choices would still depend on the context. 
Conversational pragmatics. It is possible that some people do not know anything 
about investments and the available opportunities in this respect. As a result, they take the 
experimenter’s or the salesman’s options. This seems to be the case when trading off 
unknown options like price of a computer and amount of memory (e.g., Simonson & 
Tversky, 1992). It could also matter whether participants think the financial information was 
compiled carefully by an expert. It is also important to understand whether the impact of the 
set of alternatives on people’s choices involves reasoning about the experimenter’s intentions 
(e.g., whether the options they are given as provided by a co-operative experimenter and 
hence infer that their response should naturally fall within the given range). This possibility 
could build connections between our research and pragmatic theory in linguistic 
communication (e.g., Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1983). Such pragmatic effects can be very 
subtle and can have implications for regulation of the financial services and the education of 
the public. 
Note that this hypothesis does not change our basic claims that people do not have a 
stable notion of the utility of a risky option. In this case, context would still be expected to 
play a substantial role in determining participants’ choices. In this case, they may take the 
range of available options as a clue from the experimenter about what answers may be 
appropriate. Then, if a participant judges that she is, for example, more risk averse than the 
others, she may decide to choose an option lower than the average option available. 
Separate utility scales. It is also possible that the utility scale is not common between 
laboratory gambles and real-world financial products. In other words, the utility of a 
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laboratory prospect may not be represented on the same scale as the utility of a financial 
product. There is some evidence that different goods are discounted at different rates (e.g., 
Loewenstein & Thaler, 1997). If this were the case then there is every reason to expect a 
discrepancy in risk aversion. However, our demonstration of the malleability of risky choice 
to context effects (see also Stewart et al., 2003) goes against any notion of the existence a 
stable utility scale. In other words, the demonstrated relativity of risk preferences rejects the 
hypothesis that people could develop more or less stable separate scales for gambles and 
financial products. 
Subjective probability. It is generally accepted that the subjective representation of 
probability is distorted: small probabilities are overestimated and large probabilities are 
underestimated (e.g., Prelec, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wu & Gonzalez, 1996; 
1999). This would lead to relatively small probabilities for financial losses in risky decisions 
in the real world to be overestimated while relatively high probabilities for good returns to be 
underestimated. As a result, people are likely to be more averse to take risky investment 
decisions. 
Temporal discounting. Similarly, there is good evidence that people discount future 
rewards hyperbolically (e.g., Kirby, 1997; Myserson & Green, 1995; Rachlin, Raineri, & 
Cross, 1991). However, discounting should be exponential because rates compound over 
time. Therefore investment risks, which are defined in the future (returns), will be subjected 
to such non-standard discounting. As a result, long term returns would be devalued too much 
and could be perceived as not high enough return for the amounts invested at present. This 
would require higher future returns, i.e. premiums, and would lead to seemingly more risk-
averse behavior. 
Risk and uncertainty. This explanation relates to the possibility that people might 
perceive stock investment as uncertainty instead of risk. For example, the risk of investments 
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are presented by financial advisors by simply stating stock prices can go as well up as down 
and the past performance is not guarantee for future performance. Investments funds are often 
classified on a point scale from, say, Secure to Adventurous (the later being higher risk find 
with potential for higher returns) with some historical performance data for the particular 
fund. Such statements hardly indicate nay quantifiable risk measures comparable to the ones 
used in laboratory experiments with gambles. Even more, in many countries, like UK for 
example, financial advisors are not allowed to state numeric projections of future 
performance. Therefore people would behave in the context of real investment choice as if 
facing uncertainty (which has been defined as unknown risk, Epstein, 1999). In this cases 
people display what is known as ambiguity aversion (also known as uncertainty aversion), 
which is preference for known risks over unknown risks. It is demonstrated in the Ellsberg 
paradox (Ellsberg, 1961), in which people prefer to bet on urns containing known proportions 
of balls with different colours compared to urn with unknown mix, even when this choices 
would lead to irrational decisions. The Ellsberg Paradox essentially states that we treat 
ambiguous choices as risky. This has been cited as one of the reasons for the high returns in 
the stock market (Epstein & Wang, 1994; Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent, & Williams, 2002; 
Skiadas, 2005). The argument is that since stock price movements are ambiguous, people 
treat the stock market as risky and demand high returns. 
Lack of incentive. Another possibility for the risk aversion discrepancy is that in the 
real world investments people, i.e. when real and substantial money are at stake, people more 
incentive to be cautious in relation to risk. Conversely, there would be lack of incentive to be 
careful with risk in laboratory setting where the stakes are usually rather small or 
hypothetical. Although some of the laboratory studies we reported here were conducted in 
developing countries for high payoff gambles (involving significant fraction of annual 
income), even Binswanger (1980) reported that most farmers exhibit a significant amount of 
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risk aversion that tends to increase as payoffs are increased. Holt and Laury (2002) present 
the results of a simple lottery-choice experiment that measured the degree of risk aversion 
over a wide range of payoffs, ranging from several dollars to several hundred dollars. In 
addition, they compared behavior under hypothetical and real incentives. With hypothetical 
payoffs, risky behavior is largely unaffected when hypothetical payoffs are scaled up, while 
with real payoffs, risk aversion increases sharply when payoffs are scaled up by factors of 20, 
50, and 90. This result is qualitatively similar to that reported in different choice 
environments by Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) who elicited buying and/or selling prices 
for simple lotteries, and Smith and Walker (1993) who reported increase in overbidding in 
private-value auctions as payoffs are scaled up (in auctions, overbidding relative to Nash 
predictions is usually attributed to risk aversion). Holt and Laury claim that these results 
imply that people facing hypothetical choices cannot imagine how they would actually 
behave under high-incentive conditions, which is contrary to Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979) belief to the contrary. In summary, there is convincing evidence that incentive levels 
do affect risk preferences and at this stage we cannot rule out the possibility that higher risk 
aversion in the real world might be caused by the higher gains and losses at stake.
Losses loom larger than gains. In the short term, for a risky investment, losses and 
gains are equally likely. But as losses loom larger than gains (cf., Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), people do not want to bare the potential downturns in the stock market and as a result 
might exhibit higher risk aversion. Such loss aversion combined with short-term horizon was 
proposed as an explanation of the well-known equity premium puzzle, which shows that the 
risk premium investors put on risky assets is unrealistically high (Mehra & Prescott, 1985). 
Discrepancy between expected return and actual return. Fama & French (2002) 
conclude that the expected return for stocks using accepted valuation models is much lower 
than actual stock returns of the last half-century and lower than the average investor’s 
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expectation. Therefore, there is a discrepancy between the expected return from the stock 
market, and the actual return which has in fact turned out to be higher. Thus, if people were 
aware that the actual expected return was higher, then they would be more inclined to take 
more risk.
Final summary and comments 
In this article, we presented a body of existing evidence that people are more risk 
averse when investing in financial products in the real world than when they make risky 
choices between gambles in laboratory experiments. In order to provide an account for this 
discrepancy, we investigated aspects of hypothetical decision behavior in one particular 
situation - long term investment, with the particular objective of seeing whether people can 
be motivated, by manipulating the decision context in which the options are presented to take 
more or less investment risk. We found that the range of offered financial products varying in 
their risk-reward characteristics had a significant effect on the distribution of hypothetical 
funds to those products. We also showed that people are able to use the context provided by 
the choice set in order the make relative riskiness judgments for investment products. This 
context dependent relativistic nature of risk preferences was then used as a very plausible 
explanation of the risk preference discrepancy between laboratory experiments and real-
world investments. We also discussed other possible interpretations of the discrepancy and 
only future empirical research could select the most plausible explanation of risk preferences 
in various real-world situations and circumstances.
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Appendix
 Derivation of Log Normal Equation and Corresponding Means and Variances
If the return of product X is normally distributed in log space
y x 1
2
e
x 2
2 2 (A1)
with mean α and standard deviation β, then the distribution in linear space z(w) of w 
can be derived by observing that  
x ln w (A2)
and that the area under the curve between two fixed points must be conserved under 
the transformation. Thus
x y x w z w (A3)
Now from Equation A2
d w
d x
1
w (A4)
Substituting Equations A2 and A4 into Equation A3 gives the distribution of w
z w 1
w
y lnw 1
2 w
e
ln w 2
2 2 (A5)
The mean, µ, of w is given by
w 0
w z w d w e
2
2 (A6)
and the variance, σ2, by
2
w 0
w 2 z w d w e
2 2 e
2
1 (A7)
Equations A6 and A7 may be rearranged to express the mean and standard deviation 
of the normal distribution in terms of the mean and standard deviation of the log normal 
distribution. 
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ln 1
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2 1 (A8)
2 ln
2
2 1 (A9)
The Utility of a Product
In the following analysis a financial product, X, is modeled by assuming the annual 
return is log normally distributed about a mean of µX with standard deviation of σX. The 
choice of a log normal distribution is motivated by the observation that the return at the end 
of a given time period is a product of the returns for many subdivisions of that time period. 
Transforming return into log space, this product becomes a sum of random variables, which, 
by the central limit theorem, is normally distributed. If returns are normally distributed in log 
space, then they are log normally distributed in linear space. 
If utility is assumed to be a power function of return with power γ, then the utility of a 
product may be derived from the distribution in Equation A5 using the following integral.
U X
0
w z w d w e
2 2
2 e
ln 1
2
ln
2
2 1
(A10)
Equation A10 first expresses the utility in terms of the mean and variance of the 
distribution in log space, and then in terms of the mean and variance of the distribution in real 
space. 
Compounding of a Product’s Return
Equation A10 derived in the above section expresses the distribution of returns for a 
financial product after one year. In calculating the distribution of returns after n years, it is 
assumed that the return in any given year is distributed log normally as in Equation A5, and is 
independent from the returns in other years. Thus the return after n years is the product of n 
independent samples from the distribution in Equation A5. In log space, this product becomes 
the sum of n independent samples from a normal distribution mean α and variance β2 which 
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itself is normally distributed with mean nα and variance nβ2. Thus the distribution of returns 
for a product in real space is given by
z n w
1
n 2 w
e
ln w n
2
2 n (A11)
where
n
n (A12)
n n (A13)
The mean and variance of this distribution are given by
n e
n
n
2
2 e
n
2
2 n (A14)
n
2 e2 n n
2
e n
2
1 en 2
2
e n
2
1 2n
2
2 1
n
1 (A15)
Note that the mean expected value for a product after n years is the annual average 
return raised to the power n. In other words, the mean expected value of a product will grow 
exponentially with time, as intuition suggests. 
Utility of a Compounded Product
The derivation in Equation A10 may be generalized to the case of more than one year.
U n X
0
w zn w d w e
n
n
2 2
2 e
n
n 2 2
2 e
n ln n 1
2
ln
2
2 1
(A16)
If it is assumed that the standard deviation of a product’s annual return is a linear 
function of the product’s mean annual return, i.e., 
m c (A17)
then σ can be substituted for in Equation A16. This substitution allows an expression 
for the product with maximum utility to be derived by calculating when the derivative of the 
utility with respect to µ is zero. 
When
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d U n X
d
0 (A18)
c 3 m c 2 m2 2 m2 m2 4 8
2 1 m2
(A19)
Note the absence of the n parameter from Equation 19. The implication is that the 
product with maximum utility is independent of the duration of the investment. When
2m2 2 m2 m2 4 8 0 (A20)
no real solutions exist for µ and utility is always an increasing function of return. 
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Table 1
Financial products offered in Experiments 1A and 1B.
Category Average Return
Annual percent
Risk
Government 
bonds 5%
No risk, the income is guaranteed
(beta = 0.0)
Building 
society 
account
6%
Variation of returns in the order of ±4% due to changes in 
interest rate environment
(beta = 0.2)
Endowment 
fund savings 
account
7%
Funds are invested in a mixture of bonds and fixed 
income securities with some equity investments. 
Fluctuations in annual returns of ±8% are anticipated
(beta=0.4)
Managed unit 
trust 8%
About two thirds of the fund is invested in equities and 
the remainder in government bonds.  Annual return will 
vary by ±12% around this average
(beta = 0.6)
FTSE 100 
large 
corporate 
shares
9%
Invested in larger, lower volatility equities, annual returns 
are expected to vary by ±16%
(beta=0.8)
All Share 
Index tracking 
fund
10%
Exposure to the whole equity market yields an annual 
return variation of about ±20% around the average
(beta = 1.0)
Start-up and 
Venture 
Capital fund
13%
A specialist higher risk-return fund focussed on start-ups 
and buy-outs. Annual performance may vary by ±32%
(beta=1.6)
Hedge fund 15%
This fund uses investor funds to borrow more money to 
put into the equity markets.  Annual returns may vary 
±40% around this average
(beta = 2.0)
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. The utility of money as a power function of money. The dashed lines illustrate that 
when the curve is downward concave (γ<1), the utility of a given amount is more than half 
the utility of twice that amount.  
Figure 2. The distribution of returns for a set of financial products. 
Figure 3. The relationship between risk, σ, and return, µ, for four hypothetical markets.
Figure 4. The utility of a product X as a function of the product’s average annual return, µX, 
for various degrees of risk aversion. Each panel corresponds to a different market where the 
trade-off between risk and return differs as illustrated in Figure 3. Panel A corresponds to the 
line in Figure 3 with slope 2, panel B slope 3, panel C, slope 4, and panel D slope 5. 
Figure 5. The distribution of returns for a given product (annual return µX=1.2, standard 
deviation σX=0.3) after 1, 2, 4 and 8 years.
Figure 6. The utility of a product X as a function of the product’s return, µX, after 1, 2, 4 and 
8 years for γ=0.2. In the left panel the market is as illustrated by the line of slope 2 in Figure 
3, and in the right panel the slope is 4.
Figure 7. Risk premiums plotted against people’s risk aversion (gamma) according to their 
position on the risk against return line. The risk premiums are taken from classic studies that 
relate gamma to risk premium in the market by using a representative set of investment 
portfolios.
Figure 8. Implication of different levels of risk aversion for asset values in terms of stock 
prices of a portfolio containing the Dow Jones Industrial Average. 
Figure 9. Average allocation of funds across financial products in Experiments 1A-C. (Error 
bars are standard error of the mean.) 
Figure 10. Risk-return characteristics of the investment products.
Figure 11. Allocations to each financial product in each of the three conditions.
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